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0. Introduction 
A thinker’s evidence supports some of the conclusions that they’ve drawn but probably 
not all of them.1 (Even the most rational thinkers have the odd irrational belief.) It 
supports some conclusions that they’ve never drawn and infinitely many that they 
never will. (Nobody can or should believe all the obvious consequences of the things 
they know.2) There are also some conclusions that aren’t supported by a thinker’s 
evidence now and never will be supported by it. (I would wager that nobody will have 
sufficient evidence to believe that the number of stars is even.) When there is no path 
that takes us from our evidence to a conclusion by means of good reasoning, it would 
seem there is no justification for drawing this conclusion. When a path is present, 
however, it seems to ensure that there is justification for what we believe even if, 
because of bad luck, our conclusions are mistaken. 
One way to think of the normative significance of evidence is in terms of these 
paths of evidential support.3 The presence of a path means that in principle a thinker 
could reason from the evidence they have now in such a way that they would always 
have justification to believe the conclusions the path takes them to. On the other hand, 
when there is no path that takes them from their current evidence to a conclusion via 
                                                
1 I would like to thank Kevin McCain for extensive helpful written feedback on this 
paper. I would also like to thank Maria Alvarez, Bill Brewer, Christopher Cloos, Charles 
Cote-Bouchard, Christina Dietz, Julien Dutant, Matthew Frise, John Hawthorne, 
Andrew Moon, and Ram Neta for helpful conversations on these issues.     
2 It should be obvious that nobody can believe the obvious consequences of what they 
know. If 'ought' or 'should' imply 'can', it would be wrong to say that a thinker should 
believe every obvious consequence of what they know. A thinker may believe whatever 
she sees follows from what she knows, but as I haven't seen a good case for believing 
that a thinker ought or should believe whatever she has adequate reason to believe.   
3 How should ‘support’ be understood? How should ‘adequate support’ be understood? 
The title was chosen because I’m interested in normative standing or status and how it 
is determined. I shall assume that my opponent is someone who thinks that support is 
something that is itself non-normative and that it potentially has a normative upshot.  I 
won’t assume much of anything about what kind of non-normative relations would 
have to be in place to ensure that a belief could attain some kind of positive standing. If 
readers are attracted to a view of support on which evidence supports by raising the 
probability of something and characterizes adequacy of support in terms of a degree of 
support that crosses a threshold, so be it. If instead they think we cannot say much of 
anything informative about the kind of support except to say that it is there iff 
something ‘fits’ the evidence, that should be fine, too. The support relations might be 
primitive but I shall assume that support, however, characterized satisfies the weak 
constraints outlined below.    
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good reasoning, they either need to acquire new evidence or refrain from drawing this 
conclusion. Relations of evidential support provide us with paths that we might 
permissibly follow but we cannot justifiably believe anything if a path doesn’t take us 
there from where we are now. 
 This is a tempting picture. It suggests that something like this principle must be 
true:  
The Path Principle: The types of support relations that hold 
between a thinker’s evidence and the propositions she 
grasps wholly determine whether there is propositional 
justification for believing these propositions.  
The principle tells us something negative and something positive. The negative point is 
that there is no way to have justification to believe something without a path that takes 
you to that belief that’s provided by supporting evidence. The positive point is that the 
presence of such a path is all you need for justification to draw a conclusion.  
 While I can understand the temptations to buy into this picture, this gives us a 
distorted picture of what justification is. We often speak of the available evidence as ‘a 
justification’ where we mean that it is something that we would cite in support of our 
belief. We also speak of ‘a justification’ as a kind of normative status that is like a 
permission or entitlement. It is something we have only when our beliefs conform to the 
epistemic norms or standards that govern belief. The relationship between them is 
messy.4  I do not think that there are always evidential paths that necessarily take us 
from where we are to beliefs that conform to these norms. The connection between 
following the paths of evidential support and conforming to epistemic norms is 
contingent. Talk of ‘sufficient’ evidential support obscures this because it suggests that 
there is something in the evidential support relations that would be sufficient to ensure 
that our beliefs are justified. There is not.5  Moreover, the presence of an evidential path 
                                                
4 Among other things, it is possible that a thinker has ‘a justification’ in one sense 
without having ‘a justification’ in the other because the justification the thinker has is 
not up to the task.  
5 Recall Clifford’s suggestion that it is wrong to believe without sufficient evidence. 
What could he mean by ‘sufficient’? I don’t think he could have meant that a thinker 
has sufficient evidence for her beliefs if it isn’t wrong for her to hold those beliefs. The 
idea had better be that there’s some way of understanding what it takes for the 
evidential support to be sufficient that isn’t cashed out in terms of what is or is not 
wrong to believe that accounts for the fact that some beliefs are wrongfully held and 
others are not. To get a fix on the relevant notion, it’s helpful to start with some 
examples where there is all the evidential support we could hope to have (e.g., the 
evidential support that is present in paradigmatic cases of knowledge) and then think 
about ways of understanding how this kind of support could be present or absent in 
other cases (e.g., cases where a thinker would seem to have all the same evidence).  The 
sufficiency of support should be common when we’re dealing with thinkers who have 
identical evidence or evidence that has all the same kinds of support relations. The 
argument against the Sufficiency Thesis is an argument that there is no notion of 
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is not always necessary for justification. There are situations where we can justifiably 
add a belief to our belief set even though there was no path that led us there. There is 
both more and less to justification than evidential support. 
 My target in this paper is the evidentialist view that is presupposed by the Path 
Principle. It is the view that says that facts about what a thinker has justification to 
believe (i.e., a right or permission to believe) are wholly determined by facts about a 
thinker’s evidence (e.g., what is included in her evidence, what support relations hold 
between her evidence and the propositions that she grasps). I’ve argued previously that 
justification does not supervene upon the evidence.6 The connection between a thinker’s 
justification or her reasons and the resultant normative status of her beliefs is 
contingent, not necessary. In this paper, I shall provide additional arguments against 
this supervenience thesis and an argument against a stronger determination thesis, an 
argument that shows that the Path Principle would be false even if a kind of 
supervenience thesis were true. 
  
1. Setting the Stage 
Let's say that 'evidentialism' picks out a theory of a kind of normative standing: 
propositional justification. I take propositional justification to be a kind of normative 
standing because when a thinker has it, it is acceptable, proper, or permitted for the 
thinker to believe some proposition. Our discussion will focus on the justification of full 
belief. This is the kind of belief that is required for knowledge and is presupposed by 
propositionally specified reasons explanations of the agent's actions and affective 
responses. If readers wish to draw any lessons about partial belief, they will need to 
import assumptions about full and partial belief that are not presupposed in this 
discussion.  In short, evidentialism is a theory about the justification of this kind of 
attitude. 
 Evidentialism is the view that a thinker's evidence (at a time) wholly determines 
whether there is sufficient justification for this thinker to believe p (at that time).7 To 
allow for various kinds of defeat, we should be open to the idea that the thinker's total 
evidence or some large portion of it determines whether there is sufficient justification 
for the thinker to believe a proposition (i.e, the justification of a belief turns on more 
than the thinker’s justification for holding that belief even on the evidentialist view).   
While evidentialism implies that a certain supervenience thesis is true, the thesis is 
more interesting than any supervenience thesis.  Supervenience is cheap.8 It does not 
imply that any interesting kind of dependence or determination thesis holds. All the 
necessary truths supervene upon the contingent truths about cheese and clocks, but 
nobody thinks that this tells us anything about metaphysical priority. It also does not 
                                                                                                                                                       
sufficiency that suits the evidentialist’s needs (i.e., is a non-epistemic or non-normative 
property that is sufficient for some epistemic or normative property). 
6 See my (2012), especially chapter 6. 
7 This fits Conee and Feldman’s (2004) characterization. See also McCain (2014).  
8 Comesana (2005) reminds us of this fact and turns it into an argument for externalism. 
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imply that any interesting kinds of patterns of generalizations would hold. Even if 
justification supervened upon a thinker’s evidence it could be that, say, two thinkers 
with very similar bodies of evidence could differ radically in terms of what they would 
have justification to believe.9 Evidentialism isn’t supposed to be cheap in these ways. It 
tells us that some non-epistemic facts (i.e., facts about evidence and evidential support) 
are prior to some epistemic facts (i.e., facts about propositional justification) and it 
implies that interesting patterns hold.    
 The Path Principle is supposed to capture three important dimensions of 
evidentialism.  First, it tells us that there is a decisive reason not to believe when there is 
no evidential path that takes a thinker from where they are now to a new belief:  
The Dependence Thesis: There is no situation in which it is 
appropriate for a thinker to believe p where the thinker does 
not possess evidence that provides the right support for 
believing p.10 
Second, it tells us that certain non-epistemic evidential support relations are all that 
matter for propositional justification:  
The Sufficiency Thesis: There is no situation in which a 
thinker's evidence provides the right support for believing p 
if there is a situation where this type of evidential support 
relation fails to provide sufficient support for believing a 
suitable counterpart of p. 
If, say, Agnes’ evidence differs from Agatha’s only at the level of sense (e.g., Agnes 
thinks of Venus as Hesperus and Agatha thinks of Venus as Phosphorus), they should 
have the same paths open to them since the kind of support that Agnes’ evidence 
                                                
9 It could be that Agnes’ evidence supports her belief that Hesperus shines and that this 
belief of hers is justified. It could be that Agatha’s evidence differs from Agnes’ only in 
that Agatha knows that two is the smallest prime. If there is just this difference in their 
evidence, the supervenience of justification on evidence could hold and yet Agatha 
could fail to have justification to believe that Hesperus shines. It would seem that such 
differences shouldn’t have any bearing on what justification Agatha has. It certainly 
doesn’t seem to have any bearing on what her evidence supports, how much support 
her evidence provides, etc. Thus, there had better be more to evidentialism than a 
supervenience thesis that allows for these kinds of differences.  
10 There is one wrinkle to consider. As I understand it, the Dependence Thesis tells us 
that if a thinker justifiably believes p, there is adequate evidence that supports the 
thinker’s belief in p. Does this mean that there is something that is evidence that the 
thinker has that supports the thinker’s belief in p?  That is unclear. Suppose the thinker 
has nothing in her body of evidence. Some would say that the thinker’s evidence (which 
includes no pieces of evidence) could still provide maximum support for a logical truth. 
I shall assume, contrary to this, that a thinker cannot have adequate evidence for 
believing p unless there is something that is a piece of evidence that supports p that 
could figure in some kind of recognizably good reasoning that leads to this conclusion. 
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provides her her beliefs about Hesperus are just the kind of support that Agatha’s 
evidence provides for her beliefs about Phosphorus.11 
 Third, the Path Principle reminds us that the order of dependence runs from 
evidential support to justification:  
The Determination Thesis: The propriety or impropriety of 
believing p is always determined by something more basic: 
the evidential support relations that hold between this 
content and the thinker's evidence. 
This rules out views on which we’d say that there’s a path open to Agnes because she’s 
in a position to know or justifiably believe p. The evidentialist thinks that she’s in a 
position to justifiably believe something because of the presence of a path of suitable 
evidential support.  Notice that these theses are neutral on how evidential support 
should be understood, provided that the support relation is characterizable in terms 
that don’t make essential use of normative concepts from epistemology (e.g., rationality, 
responsibility, justification, or knowledge). 
 We will look at two problems for the Path Principle. The first problem has to do 
with the Dependence Thesis. However we understand evidence and its possession, 
there are some cases of justification without evidential support. The second problem has 
to do with the Sufficiency Thesis. Even when there is evidence that supports a 
proposition that a thinker justifiably believes, that type of support might hold in other 
cases and fail to justify a thinker’s beliefs.  
  
2. The Dependence Thesis 
Cases of non-inferential belief cause trouble for the Dependence Thesis. To see why, 
let's consider an argument against the Dependence Thesis:  
P1. There is some non-inferential knowledge. 
P2. Non-inferential knowledge is either evidentially based or it is not.  
P3. Non-inferential knowledge is not evidentially based.  
C1. Thus, some knowledge is not evidentially based.  
P4. Whatever we know we have justification to believe.  
C2. Thus, there is justification that is not evidentially based. 
Foundationalists accept (P1) unless they accept a virulent form of skepticism that denies 
the possibility of all knowledge. Evidentialists should spot us the weak foundationalist 
and anti-skeptical assumptions needed for (P1). The main point of contention is not 
(P4). Remember that the relevant notion of justification is a normative one. Few would 
defend evidentialism by arguing that the relevant cases are cases of knowledge where 
the thinker shouldn't hold the belief in question. The contentious premise is (P3). If this 
premise is true, the argument is sound.  
                                                
11 Clearly it matters that the relations among their different thoughts are sufficiently 
similar. If we don’t hold those fixed, one thinker could infer surprising empirical truths 
from tautologies.  
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 Because our evidence is our knowledge, (P3) is true. Because non-inferential 
knowledge is possible, it's possible for a thinker who doesn't have any evidential basis 
for believing p to come to know p. She would therein come to have a justified belief in p 
without having had to have an evidential path that could take them from where they 
were before believing p to where they are now.12 As a consequence of coming to know p, 
the subject could acquire evidence that entails that p: the fact that p. This fact, however, 
is not the evidential basis that supports the belief. The presence of this evidential basis 
is a consequence of coming to know and coming to have a new justified belief, not the 
means by which it is possible to attain the relevant belief or for that belief to attain its 
epistemic status.  
 If E=K is correct and non-inferential knowledge is possible, it should be possible 
to construct counterexamples to the Dependence Thesis.13 We might suppose that at t, 
Agnes and Agatha are evidential duplicates. Agnes and Agatha open their eyes and 
look out their respective windows. Agnes sees rain clouds. Agatha sees blue skies.  As a 
consequence, Agnes is in a position to know that it is cloudy and that the skies aren't 
blue. Thus, she has justification to believe that it is cloudy and does not have 
justification to believe that the skies are blue. Agatha, however, is in a position to know 
that the sky is blue. She has justification to believe this and does not have justification to 
believe that it is cloudy.14  This difference is not a consequence of the evidence they had 
at t prior to coming to believe anything about the weather.  
 Because they have the same evidence at t, they should have the same evidential 
paths at t. However, at t', Agnes justifiably believes something that Agatha could not 
                                                
12 Could the evidentialist say that there are cases of knowledge or justified belief without 
evidential grounding? Perhaps, but they would then be committed to an absurdly 
permissive view. If we thought that someone who had no evidence for p or for ~p could 
nevertheless justifiably believe p, the Sufficiency Thesis would tell us that there would 
be a general permission for those who lacked evidence to believe what they had no 
evidence to believe. (Why? Because we would have admitted that the evidential 
support relation that holds between evidence that provides no support for a belief is 
sufficient to justify that belief. That, in turn, would generalize across similar cases.)   
13 These cases are also challenges to uniqueness since the differences in what Agnes and 
Agatha have justification to believe would show that certain uniqueness theses are false. 
Uniqueness tells us that Agnes and Agatha should have justification to believe the same 
things if their evidence is the same, but the example shows that one has justification to 
believe something that the other thinker should not believe. On my view, we should 
think of being in a position to justifiably believe as something like being in a position to 
know--something that can be sensitive to evidence but not something that supervenes 
upon the thinker’s evidence.  For a defense of E=K, see Williamson (2000). 
14 Remember that E=K tells us that the differences in evidential pathways that emerge 
will emerge as a result of coming to know different things. They are not the means by 
which there are interesting differences in what these thinkers are permitted to believe in 
light of their experiences if their experiences do not constitutively involve belief. (Even 
if they did constitutively involve belief, such beliefs would then be counterexamples to 
the Path Principle since they would not be evidentially based.)  
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justifiably believe (and vice versa). If what Agnes knew at t constituted an adequate 
evidential path that supported her beliefs at t', it should have given a path to Agatha, 
too. Either the evidentialist will give them too few paths (i.e., they'll say that neither 
Agnes nor Agatha could both justifiably believe that it was cloudy or that it was sunny) 
or too many paths (i.e., they'll say that neither could have any justified beliefs about the 
weather). Thus, we can use E=K to show that (P3) must be true. 
 Obviously this argument will not persuade everyone. E=K is a contentious thesis. 
I don’t offer this argument because I think it will show the evidentialists the error of 
their ways. I offer it for two reasons. The first is that it brings out one of the ways that a 
commitment to the Dependence Thesis can force us to take on commitments we would 
prefer not to. Some evidentialists say that the view is obvious or that its core 
commitments are relatively unproblematic. I don’t see how they can be obvious or 
obviously unproblematic if combining them with independently motivated 
epistemological views leads to unpalatable consequences. The second is that a perfectly 
natural way to test the Dependence Thesis is by embedding it in a framework of 
independently motivated claims to consider its consequences. If the consequences are 
problematic, we have to wonder whether the source of the problem is the Dependence 
Thesis or something else. If we combine the thesis with any propositional view of 
evidence on which possession of propositionally specified evidence requires belief in 
the proposition, we get the result that non-inferential justification and knowledge are 
impossible. I think this highlights a potentially serious problem with the thesis.  We 
have good reason to think that evidence is propositionally specified and to think that 
the possession of such evidence requires belief.   
 Here is why E=K causes trouble for the Dependence Thesis. To accommodate the 
Dependence Thesis, the evidentialist offers an account of justification that contains three 
distinct parts:   
Target: the state of the world (understood broadly) that we 
aim to represent accurately.15 
Attempt: the propositional attitude about this state that can 
be assessed for accuracy and evaluated epistemically. 
Support: something distinct from both the target and the 
attempt that provides rational support for the attempts by 
virtue of being evidence of the relevant target states.16 
                                                
15 This has to be understood broadly enough that it covers every potential object of 
thought. Thus, it includes the external world and everything internal to the mind that 
we can form beliefs about.  
16 There are some important ground rules that we need to remember as the discussion 
proceeds. First, little if anything of interest about the kind of support we have follows 
from facts about targets. Similarly, the presence of support implies little if anything 
about what the targets are like.  Moreover, these three types of item should be 
understood as distinct existences. Your attempt to settle the question whether p is not 
support for that attempt and it is not the target. (If there are special cases where this 
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If the only support that we had for our beliefs came from the things that we knew, we 
couldn't have support for our prospective non-inferential beliefs because the possession 
of such beliefs would be necessary for the possession of the relevant support. To 
formulate a view that accommodates the Dependence Thesis we need an account of 
support on which the possession of the support for some attempt (e.g., Agnes' belief 
about the weather) does not require the attempt itself. E=K rules this out. 
 The literature is filled with alternative accounts of what constitutes a thinker’s 
support (e.g., facts that the thinker knows or believes, propositions that are the contents 
of the thinker's mental states, mental states or events, etc.). This was just an opening 
gambit. Naturally someone who is attracted to the Dependence Thesis will want to offer 
an alternative account of support and its possession. Crucially, they will want an 
account on which the possession of the support we have for our non-inferential 
knowledge of p does not require the belief that p.17 There are two very different models 
of non-inferential support in the literature. On the first, having support is really just a 
matter of having some kind of propositional or representational state of mind or mental 
event.18  The support might be the state itself or the content of the state, but the account 
involves two features. First, the support plays the support role it does, in part, because 
of the relationship between the content of the attempt and the content of the support. 
Second, the thinker must occupy the non-doxastic state or undergo the relevant mental 
event to have this support but the thinker need not be aware of the state or event for it 
to provide support. We'll call this the 'occupational' view of support because the thinker 
has the support by being in some state or undergoing some experience.19 On the second 
approach, the support is something that the thinker accesses or is aware of in some 
way.20 The support (and the possession condition for it) would not need to have a 
                                                                                                                                                       
breaks down, we have to see whether the exception to the general pattern is something 
that helps or harms the evidentialist cause.)      
17 If the possession of the support required the attempt in question, there would be no 
evidential path that would permit the thinker to make the attempt in question. 
18 For a defense of the statist view on which the support consists of mental states with 
appropriate contents, see Conee and Feldman (2008), Gibbons (2014), McCain (2014), 
and Mitova (forthcoming). For a defense of the propositionalist view on which the 
support consists of the propositional contents of these states, see Fantl and McGrath 
(2009). Neta (2008) makes a convincing case for the view that evidence is specified 
propositionally and not in terms of mental states or events.  
19 A crucial feature of this approach is that there are non-doxastic antecedents to belief 
that are sufficiently like belief to have contents that stand in interesting support 
relations to beliefs.  
20 If Fumerton (1995, 2013) can be classified as an evidentialist, he is an advocate of this 
approach. On his view, the rational support that we have for our non-inferentially 
justified beliefs involves acquaintance with certain things (facts, thoughts, and a 
correspondence relation between them) where the acquaintance relation is not 
intentional or representational.  One reason to worry about lumping Fumerton in with 
the evidentialists is that his view implies that when we have non-inferential justification 
to believe p, the justification derives from acquaintance with the fact that p (and 
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representational content of any kind but would be something like a mark, clue, 
indication, or sign of the target states that could justify a belief about these target states 
only if the support is somehow made available to the thinker. We'll call this the 
'awareness' view of support. It’s important to distinguish these approaches because a 
lack of clarity about support can help to shield the weakness of the evidentialist view. 
Neither approach will give us an adequate account of non-inferential justification 
because there are clear cases of non-inferential knowledge without support as these 
views conceive of it. 
 
2.1. The Occupational View 
Some proponents of the non-occupational view would say that the possibility of 
perceptual knowledge provides no support for (P3). On this approach, the problem 
with E=K is not with the idea that support needs to be understood in terms of 
propositions that we have in mind, but with the idea that the relevant propositions have 
to be believed to provide support.21 In the case of perceptual knowledge, the beliefs that 
constitute this knowledge would count as evidentially based by virtue of the fact that 
the subject's experiences have propositional contents that stand in the right kinds of 
rationalizing relations to the subject's doxastic attempts. 
 The success of this response rests on a few controversial assumptions. The first is 
that a subject might possess a propositionally specified reason without believing the 
proposition specified as the reason.22 The second is that a subject's experience can have a 
representational content that we specify using that-clauses.23 While I think that both 
assumptions are false, we don’t have to enter into these debates now.  We can bracket 
the question as to whether the occupational model works for perceptual knowledge and 
take up the more pressing question, which is whether it can account for our intuitions 
about all cases of non-inferential knowledge. If not, the argument would rule out one 
                                                                                                                                                       
acquaintance with further things), so his view implies that we often have no evidence 
for believing p to be a fact distinct from the fact that p.    
21 Versions of this idea can be found in Brueckner (2009), Dougherty (2011), McDowell 
(1994), Schellenberg (2011), and Schroeder (2011). Is this a view that Conee and Feldman 
defend? It is difficult to say. In some places they seem to think of evidence as the 
information that a thinker ‘has to go on’. In other places, they seem to think that a 
subject’s evidence is constituted by her experiences. This doesn’t really tell us whether 
they think experiences have contents or whether their contents play an interesting 
epistemological role.   
22 Unger (1975) observed that propositionally specified attributions of reasons entail 
corresponding knowledge claims, so the linguistic data points decisively against non-
doxastic accounts of the possession of propositionally specified reasons. While some 
would prefer to ignore the linguistic data, there are good philosophical reasons for 
being concerned about non-doxastic accounts of the possession of propositionally 
specified evidence. See the subsequent note. For a helpful discussion of the ontology of 
reasons generally, see Alvarez (2010). 
23 While many people now think that experiences have representational or propositional 
content, Brewer (2011) and Travis (2013) have made a convincing case against this idea.  
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version of the Dependence Thesis even if the occupational view were right about 
perceptual justification. 
 There seem to be a number of problem cases for the occupational view’s 
handling of non-inferential knowledge. We should look for the cases where it seems 
there is no sign that anything that could play the support role as the occupational view 
conceives of it is present. Consider, for example, the knowledge that you have that you 
are thinking about Agnes, the knowledge that Agnes has that there is a pain in her knee, 
the knowledge that Agnes has that she is making a pie or trying to chop the apples, the 
knowledge that Agnes has that her legs are crossed under the table, and the knowledge 
that Agnes has that it seems that the housing market is heating up again.  In none of 
these cases does it seem that there is anything that plays the support role as understood 
by the occupational view. There is no state of mind that is distinct from both the target 
and the attempt that has a content that could rationally support the attempt in 
question.24 We don’t know about our own pains (e.g., their apparent locations, their 
intensity, that they are a pain rather than a tickle), say, because betwixt the intense 
sensation and the belief about it and its properties is a further state of mind that 
represents the properties of the pain. The same holds for the other cases of self-
knowledge, too. We don’t know that we’re thinking about epistemology because in 
addition to the first-order attitudes in virtue of which we’re thinking about 
epistemology there is some further set of propositional attitudes about these attitudes 
that support the higher-order belief that we’re thinking about epistemology.25  
One reason that these cases seem like trouble for the occupational view is that it 
seems implausible that there is something that has the right features to play the support 
role that is necessary for the justification of our attempts to get the targets right.  There 
does not seem to be any representational state of mind that, say, represents Agnes as 
believing that it is raining that justifies her belief that this is what she believes. Why 
would the mind need this third representational state? The mind would need some way 
to classify first-order mental states as being a certain type of state (e.g., a belief, a desire, 
a hope, etc.) and as having a certain content and I see no reason to think that it could 
only get its work done and lead to knowledge if it took in some sort of input and then 
                                                
24 It is helpful to control for controversies about the nature of pain. Hyman (2003), for 
example, identifies them with modes of sensitive parts of our bodies. Tye (1995), 
however, insists that they are representational states of mind. The epistemology of the 
knowledge about our representational states of mind might look very different to the 
epistemology of states of the body or non-representational aspects of our mental lives. 
(The issue is further complicated by the fact that there might be no unified approach to 
pain that is adequate. See Corns (2014).)       
25 Having looked for evidentialist discussions of the justification we have for beliefs 
about our own thoughts and actions, it looks as if the evidentialists have confined their 
discussions to the justification of introspective beliefs about our own experiences. (See, 
for example, Feldman’s discussion of the speckled hen in Conee and Feldman (2004).) In 
these discussions, it certainly looks as if the proposals dispense with any support that 
would be distinct from the target and the attempt.     
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spit out some kind of output that had a representational content like the second-order 
belief that was distinct from the belief itself. If Agnes knows that she’s thinking about 
Agatha, she does not settle this question correctly because there is, in addition to the 
thought, a representational state of mind that justifies her belief that represents her as 
thinking about Agatha.26 This seems that this is all that is required to do justice to the 
phenomenology and all that is needed for higher-order knowledge of our own mental 
lives.   
 There are two ways to press the objection. First, if there is no non-doxastic 
representational state of mind distinct from the attempt and the target, the occupational 
view implies that these aren't cases of knowledge. Since these seem to be paradigmatic 
cases of knowledge, the occupational view seems to deliver the wrong verdicts. Second, 
even if, say, our best cognitive scientists agree that there are suitable non-doxastic states 
in each case, it's troubling that we don't believe that there are suitable non-doxastic 
states in these cases. By that I mean, our intuitions about such cases aren’t triggered by 
the belief that such states are present because we don’t assume that they are. We’re 
either agnostic or believe that they’re absent, but we still think that the relevant cases 
are cases of knowledge. If we don't believe that such states are present, but we think 
that these cases are paradigmatic cases of knowledge, the occupational view does not 
mesh with our intuitions. By our lights the thing that the view says is essential for 
justification isn't present, but we think justification is present. 
   
2.2. The Awareness View 
The problem with the occupational view is that it takes justification to depend upon the 
presence of representational states of mind that we don’t have any reason to believe in. 
If such states don’t exist, some of the epistemic assessments that we are most confident 
of would turn out to be false. Until we know that such states exist, we cannot rationally 
stand behind these assessments. Since it seems pretty clear that we know what we’re 
thinking and doing and seem to have no real reason to question these assessments, the 
                                                
26 Kevin McCain raised an important question at this point. Suppose at t, Agnes believes 
that it is raining but isn’t reflecting on this belief. Her attention is elsewhere. Suppose at 
t’, however, she is reflecting on her belief. The differences might matter to the 
epistemology of self-knowledge.  Couldn’t the evidentialist say that the difference in 
what Agnes has justification to believe or is in a position to know is a difference that is 
due to a difference in evidence?  Perhaps, but this is where matters get tricky. On the 
occupational view, the relevant difference-making mental state would be a 
representational state of mind distinct from the first-order target and the second-order 
attempt. I see no reason to think that the relevant shifts in attention are due to the onset 
or acquisition of such states or to think that the ability to acquire the self-knowledge 
that Agnes can have at t’ is itself due to the presence of such states rather than, say, a 
method, ability, or process that involves attention as part of its normal function. When 
it comes to the Cartesian self-verifying judgments (e.g. this thought is about such and 
such), it seems implausible that there is, in addition to this judgment, a distinct state of 
mind that represents the judgment in light of which we can work out that it is true. We 
use an infallible skill, method, or ability.  
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best thing we can say about the occupational view is that it clashes with intuition. 
Happily, there is an alternative view, the awareness view. 
 The key difference between these views is that the awareness view doesn’t take 
the support that is purported to determine whether our attempts at getting our targets 
right to involve any kind of content or representational state of mind. We are somehow 
able to access some things that play the support role by means of some non-
representational mode of awareness.27 One helpful case to consider by way of 
illustration might be the case in which various things are observed and we form a belief 
about some targets by means of inference to best explanation (e.g., we observe some 
crumbs, the hole in the wall, hear the squeaks, and infer that a mouse is present). The 
observables needn’t be representational states of mind or have content to play the 
support role here. Perhaps we can construct a similar model for a wider range of beliefs, 
such as beliefs about the observable things in our environment where we take the 
evidential basis to be, say, aspects of a thinker’s subjective mental life and model the 
support relation on something like inference to best explanation. 
 How far can we extend this model? Let’s bracket concerns we might have about 
using this model to account for the justification of beliefs about the things we perceive 
in our surroundings because the interesting cases will be similar to those discussed 
above. The key difference between these models appears to be that neither the evidence 
possessed nor the possession of it requires a representational state of mind distinct from 
the attempt or the target. The view should thus avoid the objection to the occupational 
view (i.e., that it makes certain forms of non-inferential knowledge contingent upon the 
presence of states of mind we have no good reason to believe in).  
Unfortunately, it is hard to have much confidence in this approach since it is 
hard to see how awareness that involves no representational element could help with 
the full range of cases. Consider the case of knowledge of our own beliefs. Thought 
contents are conceptual and they individuate our attitudes. How could a non-
representational mode of access to anything ground knowledge of states individuated 
by their conceptual contents?  I don’t see how the same kind of non-conceptual 
awareness that is involved in, say, the knowledge we have of the intensity of sensation 
could be something that grounds knowledge of the conceptual contents of our thoughts 
(e.g., that it grounds the knowledge that Agnes has when she knowingly reports that 
she’s been thinking about economics, not poetry).  If such awareness is not 
representational or intentional, it is properly reported and fully characterized in terms 
of extensional reports (i.e., those reports that allow for the substitution of co-referential 
expressions salva veritate). This kind of awareness that involves no exercise of 
conceptual capacities could not bring before the mind something non-representational 
that tells us that we believe as opposed to hope or tell us that our beliefs about, say, 
                                                
27 Fumerton (1995) defends something in the neighborhood of this approach because he 
thinks that we have non-inferential justification when we have awareness of a truth-
maker, the thought that’s true because of the truth-maker, and the truth-making 
relation between them. On his view, awareness is not conceptual or representational.   
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water or Hesperus as opposed to H2O or Phosphorus.  If the goal is to determine 
whether you yourself have a belief that pertains to some target, a clue or piece of 
evidence that does not involve the same conceptual capacities exercised in that thought 
will be worthless.28  
 A proponent of this view might say that the discussion overlooks a view that 
somehow sits between the occupational and awareness view. The idea would be that 
simply being in some state of mind is enough to have evidence even if this state of mind 
isn’t itself representational and doesn’t have content and even if we don’t have access or 
awareness to this state. This proposal might seem to avoid some problems, but it seems 
to face one significant problem of its own. Williamson’s (2000) anti-luminosity 
argument shows that the mere fact that some mental state obtains or some such event 
occurs is not sufficient to ensure that a subject is in a position to know that it obtains. 
This means that when a subject is in a position to know that the state obtains, it is a 
special case and something has to distinguish this case from the case where the subject 
isn’t in a position to know. The relevant difference maker will not be evidence the 
thinker possesses, not on the present understanding of what that could be. The 
difference maker could be an ability, process, method, but it would not be a tool that we 
take from the evidentialist kit.2930   
 Once we see that some non-inferential knowledge is not evidentially based, we 
can see that the Path Principle is mistaken and why it is mistaken. We see that it is 
                                                
28 It's not just knowledge about states with conceptual content that are problematic for 
this view. See Anscombe's (1964) discussion of knowledge without clues in connection 
with our knowledge of the positions of our own limbs. 
29 Kevin McCain asked whether these are tools that the evidentialist can take on board or 
claim were already in their kit. I think not. The full range of abilities, capacities, skills, 
and methods will not supervene upon a thinker’s evidence so at best they would figure 
in an account of doxastic justification by playing some role in basing a belief on the 
evidence. We have no reason to think that such things, however, operate on evidence in 
the full range of cases. Indeed, we have good reason to think that they will not, not if 
such things are modes of awareness that are not representational. Such modes of 
awareness would not come into contact with anything that would serve as the 
appropriate input into a process that could be counted on for determining what content 
some first-order attitude had precisely because it would not involve the exercise of the 
conceptual capacities necessary for grasping the content of this attitude.    
30 It is helpful to consider an extreme test case for the view, cases of what Burge (1988) 
calls ‘basic self-knowledge’. In the case where a thinker knows that she is thinking (with 
this very thought) about water, the thinker’s knowledge is itself the thought that the 
knowledge is about. The thinker can have this knowledge even if there was nothing 
antecedent to this thought or the subject’s use of the infallible method for determining 
that she has this thought that could be the thinker’s evidence for this belief. The Path 
Principle would imply that because there was nothing prior to the thinking of the 
thought that could have provided evidential support for the relevant belief that the 
relevant belief could not have been justified. The belief is justified and constitutes 
knowledge because of the use of a good method or process, not because of a response to 
independently possessed evidence that supports belief.    
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mistaken because the principle implies that when a thinker has no evidence that 
supports believing p or believing ~p the thinker could not have justification to believe p 
and fail to have justification to believe ~p. This implication runs counter to intuitive 
verdicts about cases where we think, pre-reflectively, that a thinker knows whether p 
but does not have anything that could play the roles of evidence as understood by the 
two approaches discussed above. The problem with the principle is that it overlooks the 
possibility that evidential support is but one way amongst many for a belief to attain 
positive epistemic status. In the case of non-inferential knowledge (or, more cautiously, 
some such cases), the crucial factors that determine whether there is justification to 
believe will not be evidence, but some process, mechanism, method or ability that 
doesn’t simply operate on or process evidence that yields true beliefs without the need 
for supporting evidence.  
      
3. The Sufficiency Thesis 
Our discussion has focused on non-inferential justification and knowledge. Readers 
might wonder whether evidentialism might be right about inferential belief. While we 
might allow that there are some beliefs that can be justified without the need of 
supporting evidence, we might think that those that do need supporting evidence to be 
justified would be those that show that some the Path Principle, suitably restricted, 
might be correct.  
 There is an argument that shows that the Path Principle fails even for the 
inferentially justified beliefs that need evidential support to be justified:  
P1. A belief is justified iff it conforms to the norms that 
govern belief.31  
P2. A thinker’s belief conforms to these norms iff it 
constitutes knowledge.32 
C1. A thinker’s belief is justified iff it constitutes knowledge. 
P3. Two thinkers with precisely the same evidence for their 
belief in p can differ in that only one of them was in a 
position to know p. 
C2. Thus, two thinkers with precisely the same evidence can 
differ in that only one of them has a justification to believe p. 
The guiding idea is that justification is a normative notion and that the presence of it 
turns on whether the thinker’s beliefs conform to the norm that governs belief. This 
norm is the knowledge norm, or so I assume. Because we all agree that being in a 
position to know p would be necessary and sufficient for being in a position to conform 
                                                
31 The norms are formulated in terms of what the agent should not believe. If the thinker 
violates no norm, it is not the case that the agent should not believe what she does. In 
other words, the belief is permitted, justified, etc. For a discussion of this normative 
conception of justification, see Littlejohn (2012). 
32 For defenses of the knowledge norm, see Littlejohn (forthcoming b), Steglich-Peterson 
(2013), Sutton (2007), and Williamson (2000). 
15 
to the fundamental epistemic norm if (P1) is true and agree that being in a position to 
know does not supervene upon a thinker’s evidence, we get our desired result. A 
thinker’s evidence does not wholly determine whether there is a path from the thinker’s 
evidence at any particular time that wholly determines whether the inferential beliefs 
she formed on the basis of that evidence. If the thinker draws an inference and therein 
comes to know, the inferential belief couldn’t fail to be justified. If a thinker in the same 
evidential situation draws that inference and comes to believe without knowing, she 
couldn’t have a justified belief. This kind of luck is unavoidable.  
I don’t offer this argument to persuade evidentialists. It is the opening gambit.  
Just as the Path Principle does not mesh with live options in debates about the nature of 
evidence and its possession, it does not mesh with live options in debates about the 
identity of the norms that govern belief. Because of this, it’s fair to press the 
evidentialist for a defense of the Path Principle. I should note at this point that I have 
never seen any argument for the Sufficiency Thesis in the literature. In conversations 
with those sympathetic to evidentialism, I’ve been told that while there is no such 
argument in the literature, the strongest case for the core commitments of the view is 
indirect. The idea is that the evidentialist will try to show that their view does the best 
job accounting for cases and vindicating intuitions. We’ve already seen some reason to 
think that the view fails to do this since it struggles to handle some cases of non-
inferential knowledge. In this section we shall also see that it clashes with some 
intuitions about rational belief.  
It is clear that the Sufficiency Thesis would be false if (P1) and (P2) were correct. 
If the justification of belief depended upon whether it constituted knowledge, 
justification would not supervene upon the evidence because facts about what a thinker 
is in a position to know do not supervene upon the thinker’s evidence. If we combine 
(P2) with the Path Principle, we get the result that there is no adequate path of 
evidential support that would take a thinker to p unless every thinker with just her 
evidence would be in a position to know that p. For many things that we know, no such 
paths exist. Cases of inductive knowledge come to mind here. Even if you accept E=K, 
for example, you’d have to acknowledge that a complete description of a subject’s 
evidential paths wouldn’t determine whether the thinker would have justification to 
believe p because the truth of the conclusion of an inductive inference does not 
supervene upon a thinker’s present knowledge.   
This might convince some people that they ought to reject (P2). It might seem 
obvious to some people that a complete description of the thinker’s evidence must 
determine whether it would be appropriate to use it by drawing an inference from it or 
basing a belief on it. If you think that this is the right thing to say, you might replace 
(P2) with something that would allow for justification without knowledge:  
(P2’) P2. A thinker’s belief conforms to these norms iff it is 
based on sufficient evidence. 
If we substitute this evidentialist thesis for (P2) in the argument, it’s clear that the 
argument’s conclusion cannot be reached. While I won’t argue here for the conclusion 
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that (P2) is preferable, we will see that (P2’) suffers from the same kind of problem that 
(P2) is alleged to. Given some plausible assumptions about what rationality requires 
from us, there will be situations analogous to the situations taken to be problematic for 
(P2): pairs of thinkers who have the same evidential support for their respective beliefs 
can differ in that only one thinker has sufficient justification for her beliefs.  
 Let’s start by considering a putative rational requirement that many of us take to 
be intuitively compelling, the requirement that says that it’s irrational to fail to V when 
you believe that you ought to V. This requirement, which is known as the ‘Enkratic 
Requirement’, states that it is irrational to be akratic and it seems that on its best 
formulation it is a wide-scope requirement (i.e., one that says that rationality prohibits a 
certain combination).  When formulated as a wide-scope requirement, we don’t face 
problems with bootstrapping or irrational beliefs putting rational pressure on a thinker 
to V. While we formulate this as a wide-scope requirement, Titelbaum has shown us 
how to derive a narrow-scope requirement from it, one that says that whenever 
rationality prohibits V-ing, it is not rational to believe that V-ing is required. The upshot 
of this is that rationality prohibits a certain kind of mistaken normative belief, one that 
represents V-ing as required when V-ing is prohibited.  According to the Fixed-Point 
Thesis, this putative rational requirement is a genuine one.  
The Fixed-Point Thesis is a surprising consequence of the Enkratic Requirement.33  
If the Fixed-Point Thesis is correct, we can use it to attack the Sufficiency Thesis. First, 
let’s suppose that Jermaine is in the good case and he knows that he ought to V. He thus 
has sufficient evidence to believe that he ought to V. (Why think that? Remember that 
we’re assuming that Jermaine’s belief is justified if it constitutes knowledge and that a 
thinker cannot fail to have adequate evidence if the thinker has a justified belief.34) On 
the evidentialist view, there must be something that plays the evidence role that 
provides adequate support for Jermaine’s belief.35   
 Next, let’s stipulate that Jack has evidence that provides the same type of support 
for his belief that he ought to V’.  Because of this and because Jermaine’s belief is 
justified, the Sufficiency Thesis tells us that Jack should have adequate evidence and 
justification to believe that he ought to V’. However, we should be able to stipulate that 
                                                
33 Titelbaum (2015a) shows us how to derive the Fixed-Point Thesis from the Enkratic 
Requirement. The proof is not particularly complicated and the assumptions needed for 
the derivation are not particularly controversial. In Littlejohn (2012), I argued that 
something like the Fixed-Point Thesis supported a form of externalism about 
justification that was incompatible with evidentialism and argued that we needed this 
kind of externalism to understand how there could be categorical requirements that 
applied to all rational agents.   
34 In this context, a thinker can have adequate evidence even if there is nothing in her 
body of evidence that supports the target proposition if, say, the proposition is one that 
the thinker can justifiably believe without evidence. 
35 We don’t have to worry about what this evidence might be. It could be seemings or 
appearances, propositions that are the contents of the thinker’s mental states, facts that 
the thinker knows, or facts about the thinker’s mental states.  
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Jack ought not V’. The Fixed-Point Thesis implies that Jack’s belief is not justified. Thus, 
there is a clash between the Sufficiency Thesis and the Fixed-Point Thesis. In turn, there 
is a clash between evidentialism and the Enkratic Requirement.   
The Fixed-Point Thesis implies that Jack cannot rationally believe that he ought 
to V’. If it is not rational for him to believe that he ought to V’ even though he has 
evidence that provides the same type of support for his normative beliefs as Jermaine’s 
evidence provides, we should reject the Sufficiency Thesis. Although the contents of 
their normative beliefs differ and different things are included in their respective bodies 
of evidence, the same type of support relations  hold between their respective normative 
beliefs and their evidence. If such relations wholly determined the justificatory standing 
of Jermaine’s beliefs, they should ensure that Jack’s beliefs were justified, too. They do 
not do that. Jack's normative belief is not justified. Thus, there is something further that 
matters to the justification of normative belief. 
Notice that the argument is perfectly general.  In arguing against the Sufficiency 
Thesis, we only assumed that a kind of fallible support relation is sufficient for 
justification and then pointed out that this relation should hold in the relevant good 
case/bad case pair. We didn’t assume that sufficiency should be understood in terms of 
strength, high probability, or anything of the sort. Whatever support relation helps to 
make the good case good might be present without preventing things from going bad in 
the bad case and leading our thinker astray. For a special class of targets, it turns out 
that a certain kind of error is sufficient to ensure that the failed attempt is a rational 
failure, not some mere mistake. Since irrationally held beliefs are not justified, we have 
our counterexample to the Sufficiency Thesis: if evidential support were sufficient for 
justification, Jack’s beliefs and Jermaine’s beliefs would have the same status. 
The evidentialist might consider one of two lines of response. First, they might 
try to show that evidentialism is actually compatible with the Enkratic Requirement.36 It 
seems that they are incompatible because it seems, crudely put, that whatever target we 
attempt to get right, it’s always possible for the support we have to lead us astray.  
Suppose, for example, that you take the support that Agnes has for believing that she 
ought to V to be an intuition or a seeming with a certain content: that she ought to V.  If 
this, given Jermaine’s total evidence, makes it the case that she can justifiably believe 
that she ought to V, it should be possible for someone like Jack to have a body of 
evidence that includes the seeming that he ought to V’ and be suitably modified so that 
the same support relations hold between Jack’s supporting evidence and his belief. 
Thus, we’d expect the evidentialist to say that their beliefs have to have the same 
justificatory status.  This assumption can be challenged. Some might say that there is 
some sort of necessary connection between the normative truths and what a body of 
evidence can support.  
                                                
36 I agree with Coates (2012), Field (forthcoming), and Lasonen-Aarnio (MS) that 
evidentialism is incompatible with the Enkratic Requirement. See Littlejohn 
(forthcoming) for a defense of the requirement.  
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One way to understand the proposal is by thinking about an analogy with logical 
truths.37 Whatever evidence a thinker has, it’s a consequence of the probability-raising 
conception of evidential support that a thinker has maximal support for the truths of 
logic. This is not because every thinker has some premise or set of premises that could 
figure in her reasoning that could lead her to reason well to the conclusion that these 
truths are true, however. Perhaps something similar could be said about normative 
truths. The idea is not that every thinker has a premise or set of premises that could 
figure in good reasoning that would lead them to see the light; rather, the idea is that 
every body of evidence (including one free of any pieces of evidence) provides maximal 
support for some truths (e.g., logical truths and (perhaps) normative truths). 
As interesting as this proposal is, I don’t think that it accounts for the relevant 
data.  This idea that we all have maximal evidential support for truths about the 
requirements of rationality is not plausible if we’re talking about truths about particular 
cases where the reasoning that leads us to conclusions about what rationality requires 
rests on some empirical assumptions. When it comes to particular judgments about 
particular cases, however, this loses plausibility because such judgments rest on 
assumptions about the particular case that often can only be known through 
observation. (Contrast the judgment that we should be conciliatory in a case of peer 
disagreement and the judgment that I should be conciliatory when Agnes tells me that 
I've miscalculated the tip.) The important point is that our intuitions about rationality 
extend to particular cases where we think it would be irrational for someone to fail to V 
when they’ve judged on the basis of a mix of apriori and empirical considerations that 
they ought to V.  Thus, a complete explanation of the relevant intuitions about rational 
combinations of mental states needs tools that the evidentialists don't have.   
The evidentialist could, of course, just deny the Fixed-Point Thesis, but they’d 
have to deny the Enkratic Requirement, too. That comes with the obvious cost that we’d 
be rejecting a widely shared intuition about rationality (i.e., that we should avoid the 
incoherent clashes that constitute epistemic akrasia) to preserve a principle about the 
relationship between evidence and justification that we have no good reason to accept. 
If we don't have evidence for the Sufficiency Thesis it wouldn't be in keeping with the 
spirit of the view if we cleaved to it when faced with arguments against it. 
Discussion of the Enkratic Requirement reveals something important about the 
tempting idea that a complete description of a thinker's evidential support should 
wholly determine whether they have justification to believe a proposition Because (P2) 
conflicts with this idea, it is tempting to reject it and replace it with an evidentialist view 
                                                
37 See Titelbaum (2015b) for some discussion of the analogy. Some authors (e.g., Smithies 
(2012), Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013)) seem to think that we have a special kind of 
evidential support or justification for believing the logical truths as well as the truths 
about the requirements of rationality. (It is unclear whether these authors distinguish 
propositional justification from adequate evidential support.) In Dutant and Littlejohn 
(forthcoming), we present a number of problems for views on which facts about the 
requirements of rationality satisfy some kind of epistemic constraint.  
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that supports (P2'). If the Enkratic Requirement is correct and there are fixed-points in 
Titelbaum's sense, we have to abandon the idea that the type of evidential support we 
have for believing some normative propositions wholly settles whether there is 
justification to believe them. In these special cases (at least), certain kinds of mistakes 
cannot be rationally made whatever support we have for believing the mistaken 
proposition. The requirement shows that a complete description of a thinker's evidence 
support does not wholly determine whether they have justification to believe. The 
precise nature of that type of support does not matter. The point generalizes to every 
notion of support that can be characterized in non-normative terms and allows for a 
non-skeptical view on which it's possible to know and justifiably believe some things 
about the requirements of rationality. 
Notice, too, that the problems that these fixed-points generate show something 
interesting about the supervenience of justification upon evidence. Suppose the relevant 
fixed-points are necessary truths about the requirements of rationality, such as 
requirements about how we should respond to disagreement, what we should think 
about lottery cases, or general requirements concerning logical consistency. These truths 
will supervene upon any body of evidence because they are necessary truths. Thus, we 
do not need to point to conditions that fail to supervene upon a thinker's evidence to 
show that the Sufficiency Thesis is false. Even if justification did supervene upon a 
thinker's evidence, the type of evidential support relations that hold between the 
thinker's beliefs and the propositions they believe would still not determine whether the 
thinker had adequate justification to believe. Thus, while I think that justification does 
not supervene upon a thinker's evidence and does not supervene upon a thinker's non-
factive mental states, we can construct counterexamples to the Sufficiency Thesis 
without begging the question against those who insist that these theses are true. 
  
Conclusion  
I have pointed to two problems with the Path Principle. It's possible to acquire 
knowledge and justified belief without supporting evidence. Thus, the absence of a path 
of evidential support is itself not a decisive reason to think that a thinker could not have 
a justified belief about some matter. In some cases of non-inferential knowledge, the 
methods by which our beliefs are formed are methods by which we acquire knowledge 
and thereby acquire evidence. The methods do not themselves need to operate on 
anything that we would recognize as evidence. It is also possible for thinkers to have 
beliefs that differ in justificatory status when their respective beliefs receive the same 
type of evidential support. Thus, the type of support relations that hold between a body 
of evidence and a proposition does not completely settle whether a thinker has 
justification to believe the proposition just as this evidence and the support it provides 
does not completely settle whether a thinker is in a position to know the proposition.  
 Once we reject the Dependence Thesis and the Sufficiency Thesis, we do not 
need a further argument against the Determination Thesis. This seems like a good place 
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